I'm a philosopher at the University of Maryland, College Park. I work on modal language, causal reasoning, expressivism, intentionality, variables, future-oriented talk, scalar implicature, and a few more things.
Abstract: "S is able to phi" says that there is a circumstantial possibility where S phis, and presupposes that whether S phis depends at least partly on S. This contrasts with accounts of ability ascriptions based on agency.
Abstract: The probability of a counterfactual "If A, would B" should be identical to the probability of B, in the counterfactual scenario where A. This is true whether we udnerstand "probability" as chance or as credence.
Abstract: We present experiments that investigate connectives in counterfactual antecedents. The evidence suggests that negation generates alternatives, partly via appealing to the question under discussion (QUD).
Abstract: We show how to capture the interaction between probability and modality, including Stalnaker's Thesis, in a fairly standard dynamic/informational semantics.
Abstract: A triviality result for counterfactuals that does not depend on endorsing any particular bridge principle between counterfactuals and probability.
Abstract: Selectional and informational views of indicative conditionals are often taken to be at odds. This paper shows how to get a semantics that has the virtues of both.
Abstract: Assume, as seems very reasonable, that informational consequence preserves certainty. Triviality ensues, without any assumptions about the semantics of modals or conditionals.
Abstract: "I", "you", and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer to elements of the context. This happens under epistemic operators.
