I'm a philosopher at the University of Maryland, College Park. I work on modal language, causal reasoning, expressivism, intentionality, variables, future-oriented talk, scalar implicature, and a few more things.
Abstract: We present experiments that investigate connectives in counterfactual antecedents. The evidence suggests that negation generates alternatives, partly via appealing to the question under discussion (QUD).
Abstract: We show how to capture the interaction between probability and modality, including Stalnaker's Thesis, in a fairly standard dynamic/informational semantics.
Abstract: A triviality result for counterfactuals that does not depend on endorsing any particular bridge principle between counterfactuals and probability.
Abstract: Selectional and informational views of indicative conditionals are often taken to be at odds. This paper shows how to get a semantics that has the virtues of both.
Abstract: Assume, as seems very reasonable, that informational consequence preserves certainty. Triviality ensues, without any assumptions about the semantics of modals or conditionals.
Abstract: "I", "you", and the like are shifted by certain modal operators and hence can fail to refer to elements of the context. This happens under epistemic operators.
