Counterfactuals have been discussed extensively by logicians, philosophers of language, and metaphysicians, as well as in several fields outside philosophy. They also figure prominently in philosophical theories in other subfields; some examples include theories of explanation, theories of intentionality, and theories of knowledge. Despite the abundance of literature, they remain a central area of inquiry, and arguably some of the most interesting work on counterfactuals has been produced over the last 15-20 years. This seminar gives both an overview of classical literature and introduces some recent work.
We will start from what is generally considered the standard semantics for counterfactuals in philosophy, i.e. the closeness semantics laid out by David Lewis, Robert Stalnaker, and others. Then we will explore three other aspects of the theory of counterfactuals, each of them in a dedicated unit. The first is the nature of closeness; the second is the link between counterfactuals and rational credence; the third is the grammatical architecture of counterfactuality.
(Syllabus)
Week 1. Introduction: Goodman's problem; introduction to modal semantics (handout)
Unit 1. Closeness Semantics
Required reading: Lewis, Counterfactuals, chapters 1 & 2.3.
Week 3. Conditional Excluded Middle (handout)
Week 4. Random Selection (handout)
Unit 2. Closeness, Chance, and Indeterminacy
Week 5. Lewis on Closeness and the Problem of Chances
Side reading: Hajek, "Most Counterfactuals are False".
Week 6. Typicality and Humility
Week 7. Logic, Indeterminacy, and Possibilities
Unit 3. Triviality
Week 8. Chance-Credence Principles
Required reading: Meacham, "Two Mistakes about the Principal Principle"; Schulz, Counterfactuals and Probability, chapter 3; Cariani and Santorio, "Chance-Credence Principles".
Side reading: Lewis, "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance"; Skyrms, "The Prior Propensity Account of Subjunctive Conditionals".
Week 9. Triviality, 1/2
Required reading: Khoo and Santorio, "Lecture Notes:Probability of Conditionals in Modal Semantics"", chapters 1 and 2; Williams "Counterfactual Triviality".
Side reading: TBA.
Week 10. Triviality, 2/2
Required reading: Schwarz, "Subjunctive Conditional Probability"; Santorio, "A Collapse Result for Probabilities of Counterfactuals".
Side reading: Schulz: Counterfactuals and Probability, chapter 5.
Week 11. Expressivism
Required reading: Edgington, "Counterfactuals"; Stalnaker, "Counterfactuals and Probability".
Side reading: Edgington, "Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?".
Unit 4 (Tentative). Tense and the Future-Counterfactuals Link
Week 12. TBA
Required reading: TBA; possibly: Iatridou, "The Grammatical Ingredients of Counterfactuality"; Condoravdi, "Modals for the Future and for the Past".
Side reading: TBA.
Week 13. TBA
Required reading: TBA; possibly: Iatridou and von Fintel, "Prolegomena to a Theory of X-Marking""
Side reading: TBA.
Week 14. TBA
Required reading: TBA
Side reading: TBA.
Week 15. Wrap-up
No required reading; presentation/discussion of final papers.
Side reading: TBA.